DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 170 943 EA 011 726

AUTHOR Main, Robert G.
TITLE Consolidation of Federal Aid Programs for Education. A Case for Block Grant Funding.
PUB DATE [79]
NOTE 44p.; Table II may be marginally legible due to light print

EDRS PRICE MF01/PC02 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS Educational Legislation; Educational Policy; Elementary Secondary Education; Equal Education; *Federal Aid; *Federal Programs; Federal Regulation; *Government Role; Government School Relationship; Resource Allocations; Revenue Sharing
IDENTIFIERS *Block Grants; *Categorical Aid

ABSTRACT

The need for a new approach to federal support of education by reducing the number of narrow categorical aid programs is developed through a case study of the 1976 Ford Administration proposal for a consolidated block grant of 24 separate authorities. The merits of block grant funding are examined both in terms of the administration-sponsored bill and in the broader context of school financing and national education policy. The history of federal aid and the constitutional issues involved are discussed along with the political processes and an appraisal of the constituent forces and their degree of participation in the failure of the proposal. The study is based on a review of the literature, examination of previous education legislation, congressional testimony, hearings, conference reports, and government studies. Personal interviews were conducted with congressional aides and staff members, bureaucrats in executive agencies, and members of educational lobby groups. A position supporting the concept of block grant funding as a means of reform for federal education programs is provided. Recommendations are made for actions by educators and administrators to secure the conditions that will allow focus on level of federal support for education rather than competition for categorical aid programs. (Author/JM)

****
* Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made *
* from the original document. *
****

ED170943

U S DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
EDUCATION & WELFARE
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
EDUCATION

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN REPRODUCED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED FROM THE PERSON OR ORGANIZATION ORIGINATING IT. POINTS OF VIEW OR OPINIONS STATED DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT OFFICIAL NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION POSITION OR POLICY

CONSOLIDATION OF FEDERAL AID PROGRAMS FOR EDUCATION:

A CASE FOR BLOCK GRANT FUNDING

by

Robert G. Main, Associate Professor
Center for Information and Communication Studies
California State University, Chico
Chico, California

EA 011 726

"PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATERIAL HAS BEEN GRANTED BY

R. G. Main

TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)."

ABSTRACT

CONSOLIDATION OF FEDERAL AID PROGRAMS FOR EDUCATION: A CASE FOR BLOCK GRANT FUNDING

The need for a new approach to federal support of education by reducing the number of narrow categorical aid programs with their attendant bureaucratic red tape is developed through a case study of the 1976 Ford Administration proposal for a consolidated Block Grant of some 24 separate authorities. The merits of block grant funding are examined both in the explicit terms of the administration sponsored bill and in the broader context of school financing and national education policy. The history of federal aid and the constitutional issues involved are discussed along with the political processes and an appraisal of the constituent forces and their degree of participation in the failure of the proposal to gain favorable Congressional action. The study is based on an extensive review of the literature and examination of previous education legislation, Congressional testimony, hearings, conference reports and government studies. Personal interviews were conducted with congressional aides and staff members, bureaucrats in the executive agencies and members of educational lobby groups concerned with federal education programs.

A position supporting the concept of block grant funding as a means of reforms for federal education programs is provided. Recommendations are made for actions by educators and administrators to secure the conditions and assurances that will allow focus on the level of federal support for education rather than the competition for categorical aid programs.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
Introduction	1
Methodology	2
Definition of Terms	3
Description of Administration's Block Grant Proposal	4
Historical Background	11
The Issue of Federal Control	15
The Role of Federal Financial Aid	19
Summary	31
Reference Notes	37

CONSOLIDATION OF FEDERAL AID PROGRAMS FOR EDUCATION: A CASE FOR BLOCK GRANT FUNDING

Introduction

The federal government supports about 7 percent of the total cost of elementary and secondary education in the United States.[1] The bulk of that support is channeled through numerous narrow categorical programs. It is distributed through states to local educational agencies through mechanisms that take into account such factors as school age population and income levels of student's families.

The federal effort has helped to assure that children with special needs receive an equal educational opportunity, but it has also led to the promulgation of layers of rules and regulations and the imposition of administrative burdens at the local level which are unrelated to the development of programs of quality education.

In his 1976 State of the Union address, President Ford announced his intention to propose consolidation of a number of education programs into one block grant in order to minimize the intrusiveness and burden of federal regulations while continuing appropriate federal support for education.

The Ford Administration's program for block funding was subsequently developed by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and formally introduced on March 1, 1976 for legislative action as HR12196 by Rep. Albert Quie, the ranking Republican on the House Committee on Education and Labor.[2] An identical bill was placed before the Senate on March 17 by Senator Beall.[3] From the beginning, it was the general consensus among the Washington political education community of bureaucrats, Congress, and lobbyists that the legislation had no chance of success.[4] Neither bill was reported out of committee and the only

attention accorded the proposals by Congress was two perfunctory hearings before the House General Education Subcommittee.[5]

The purpose of this paper is to examine the merits of the Ford Administration proposal for block grant funding for federal aid to education both as to its specific aims and in the broader context of school financing and national policy.

I will present first the provisions of the legislation proposed and the expected import of its implementation. To provide perspective, a review of federal aid to education will be made to include the historical context and the constitutional and legal factors bearing on the issue. The merits of block grant funding will be discussed within the framework of the basic issues involved. Finally the political processes will be examined with an appraisal of the constituent forces and their degree of participation, and the apparent lack of enthusiasm for support of the Ford Administration's block grant proposal.

Methodology

The research for the subject involved a review of the literature and examination of legislation, Congressional testimony, hearings, conference reports, and government studies concerning federal aid to education. In addition, personal interviews were conducted with congressional aids and staff members of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives Committees for Education, bureacrats in the Office of Management and Budget, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, and the U.S. Office of Education. Eleven educational lobby groups were also contacted and representatives interviewed.

No attempt was made to develop a formal questionnaire and the interviews were informal and largely unstructured. Initially, the strategy was to identify and contact top policy makers but this was abandoned after two interviews not because the officials were inaccessible, but rather because they were unwilling

or unable to discuss the issue in any depth. They referred me to "action officers" on the staff for more detail and I subsequently limited my contacts to mid-level management and staff personnel identified to me as the specialists for the subject. In general, I found congressional aides to be the most knowledgeable of the basic issues involved, the mid-level bureacrats with a more narrow and technical expertise and surprisingly, the educational lobbyists the least informed and the least interested in the particulars of the proposal.

The latter group appeared most pragmatic in that they felt the legislation had no future with the 94th Congress and they concentrated their energies on other bills that were expected to be reported out of committee. Only one group (the National Governor's Conference) had bothered to prepare an analysis for their members and it was less than two pages in length. The nature of the interviews required a largely qualitative analysis. The perceptions, attitudes and behavior of the participants contributed as much to evaluation of positions as the factual data obtained.

Definition of Terms

A conventional block grant is simply providing a sum of money to each State based on some specified distribution formula. It provides maximum flexibility to the state in that application of the funds are made on the basis of educational needs and goals determined by the State. In its pure form it is simply revenue sharing and is classified as "general aid" to education.

Categorical aid is the allocation of funds for a particular type of education program for a particular target audience. Implicit in categorical aid is the determination of need and educational goals at the National level.

Within these broad definitions are a number of methods of resource allocations that have very different characteristics in terms of restrictions.

Impact aid, for example, is a conventional block grant program that is virtually unrestricted in application except in the distribution qualification. On the other hand, block grants may be modified in a number of ways to limit application in such manner as to insure conformance with national goals or policy and thus take on characteristics of categorical aid.

The Ford Administration's proposal for block grant funding falls in this latter category and should more appropriately be classified as a qualified block grant. However, the fundable federal dollars could be mixed in the school budget pot and therefore the basic difference from categorical aid was retained.[6]

A qualified block grant is a kind of aid which is more flexible than categorical aid and more structured than revenue sharing. It provides general aid for broad programmatic areas with limited restrictions for application and information on how the funds have been spent.

Description of the Ford Administration's Block Grant Proposal

The bills introduced in the 94th Congress dealt with the "consolidation" into a single block grant authority of the following programs:

1. Titles I, II, III, IV, and V of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965,
2. The Education of the Handicapped Act,
3. The Vocational Education Act of 1963, and
4. The Adult Education Act.

The proposed legislation authorized $3.3 billion in fiscal year 1977 (school year 1977-1978). This authorization was to be increased by $200 million annually in fiscal years 1978, 1979, and 1980.

Of the $3.3 billion available in fiscal year 1977, $3.231 billion was to be directly available to states under Titles II and III of the legislation. The $200

million annual additional funding was also to be directly available to the states in succeeding years. $69 million would have been authorized annually for the use of the Commissioner of Education on national impact projects for vocational education and for the handicapped.

Listed in Table I are the presently existing programs which were to be consolidated in Titles II, III, and IV of the act, together with the actual fiscal year 1975 and 1976 appropriations for those programs.

TABLE I:

ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY, HANDICAPPED AND ADULT EDUCATION PROGRAMS[7]

	Appropriations (Dollars in Millions)	
	FY 75	FY 76
Elementary and Secondary Education		
Grants for disadvantaged	1 900	2 050
Support and innovation grants	173	185
Education for the Handicapped		
State grants (Part B)	100	110
Severely handicapped projects	3	3
Specific learning disabilities	3	5
Early childhood education	13	22
Regional vocational, adult, and post-secondary education	.6	2
Recruitment and information	.5	.5
Special education manpower development	38	40
Adult Education	68	72
Library Resources		
School libraries and instructional resources	127	147
Vocational Education		
Basic vocational education	428	423
Programs for students with specific needs	20	20
Consumer and homemaking education	36	41
Work study	10	10
Cooperative education	20	23
State advisory council	4	4
Curriculum development	1	1
Research	18	18
National Impact Projects		
Vocational innovation	16	16
Innovation and development for handicapped	9	11
Deaf-blind centers	12	16
Media services and captioned films	13	16
Regional resource centers for handicapped	7	10
Total:	3,030	3,242

The list of programs to be included in the consolidation reflects changes made subsequent to the time the President's fiscal year 1977 Budget was submitted to the Congress. These changes resulted from an unusually successful lobbying effort by the Higher Education and American Library Associations with the White House and OMB. As a result of their efforts, four programs which dealt with higher education and libraries were deleted from the proposal.[8] They were:

	Appropriations (Dollars in Millions)	
	FY 75	FY 76
Public libraries (Library Services and Construction Act)	52	52
College libraries (Higher Education Act)	10	10
Training and demonstrations for librarians (Higher Education Act)	3	2
Undergraduate instructional equipment (Higher Education Act)	8	8

The Deaf-Blind Centers Program originally listed as a separate program was added so that a total of 24 programs were eventually included in the Bill.

The formula for distribution of federal funds to the States under the proposed Bill was based upon the number of children from families below the poverty level and the school-age population (ages 5 through 17 inclusive) of a State.

Each State was to receive not less than 85 percent of the amount allotted to that State in the preceding fiscal year under the 24 programs consolidated.

After these allocations, the remaining funds were to be distributed by a formula of 60 percent based on the number of children from families below the poverty level and 40 percent on the basis of school age population. The sum thus obtained was to be multiplied by the ratio of the state average per pupil expenditure to the national average per pupil expenditure--however, no state

was to be treated as being less than 80 percent or more than 120 percent of the national average per pupil expenditure. Under this formula, all States would have gained over FY 1975 funding levels.

The legislation proposed was by no means a pure "block grant", i.e., a revenue sharing scheme with no strings attached. There were a number of requirements a state had to meet in order to participate in the program.

All relevant civil rights procedures were retained in "full force."[9] The Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare was to be given authority to determine non-compliance and to reduce funds available. No funds could be paid to any local educational agency which was deemed out of compliance with civil rights statutes.

States were required to provide children in non-public schools an equitable opportunity to participate in programs receiving federal funds. The states would also be required to serve children in Indian tribal schools.

If a state were legally unable, or failed to provide for participation of non-public school or Indian children, the Commissioner of Education was to arrange for services to such children by contract or otherwise, and deduct the cost from the state's allocation.

The proposed act required that 75 percent of all federal funds were to serve the needs of the educationally-deprived and handicapped. For the first school year after enactment, it required states to pass through federal funds for use of local educational agencies at a level of at least 85 percent of the preceding year. It also required that there would be no reduction in the percentage of federal funds spent on vocational education needs.

As an example, if a state received from the federal government $30 million for the purposes of vocational education in FY 1976, and this amount represented 10 percent of the total federal funds received under the programs consolidated,

that state had to spend at least 10 percent of the federal funds it received under the block grant for the purposes of vocational education.

One of the more interesting provisions of the proposed law was the requirement for each state to establish, as a matter of state law, the structures and procedures of a planning process for use of the federal funds. Within that broad flexible authority, each state would have been required to:

1. designate the state agency or agencies to administer the program,
2. develop and publish a plan for use of the funds,
3. certify to the U.S. Commissioner of Education that it had such a plan, and
4. certify annually that it had complied with the plan, or inform the U.S. Commissioner of Education of any substantial failure to comply with the plan.

Further, states would have been required to:

1. develop procedures for the independent monitoring within the state of compliance with the plan,
2. submit those procedures to the U.S. Commissioner of Education for approval, and
3. meet certain independent audit, evaluation, and reporting requirements.

The Commissioner's approval authority described in number two above was a limited one. It was to be granted only to emphasize the importance to the federal government of the states establishing the means to comply with their own plans.

With regard to procedures, states were to be required to establish means for obtaining the views of appropriate state and local agencies, units of local government, citizens, and private institutions, and establish a means to ensure that the educational needs of all residents of the state were taken into account.

The proposed law would have required the proposed plan to be published at least ninety days prior to the beginning of the program year. Public comment

was to be accepted for at least forty-five days and the final plan would then have to be published prior to the beginning of the program year. The state was then to summarize and publish the comments received and their disposition. Finally, the state plan would have been required to:

1. set forth objectives of the plan;
2. provide for the allocation and use of funds within the state in accordance with requirements of the act;
3. set forth the policies and procedures used by the state to funds distributed to LEA's (local educational agencies) so that such distribution took into account the number of handicapped, educationally-deprived, and low-income children in each LEA, with adjustments for local cost and tax base variation;
4. set forth the amount of funds to be distributed to each LEA;
5. describe the organizational structure through which the program would be administered;
6. describe the process the state would use to ensure adequate planning by local educational agencies for use of the funds;
7. describe the means by which non-public and Indian tribal school children would be served under the program;
8. provide that at least 75 percent of the funds be passed through by the state to local educational agencies;
9. provide that not less than 75 percent of the funds be used to meet the special educational needs of the educationally-deprived and the handicapped; and
10. provide that the state would not use more than 5 percent of its allocation for administrative purposes.

If a state designated a separate state agency to administer its vocational education program, it could also develop a separate state plan for that purpose. However, that plan was to be subject to the same due process provisions as the comprehensive state plan. It would have to be developed in coordination with the comprehensive plan, and be published at the same time and in the same manner as that plan.

Where states did not comply with the requirements of the legislation or meet the commitments set forth in their own plan, the Commissioner of Education was to have a flexible penalty provision at his disposal. He could have, after notice and an opportunity for a hearing, either make no further payments to the state or reduce the amount of payments by up to three percent.

The final provision of the proposed law provided funds for national impact projects. It would have continued the U.S. Office of Education's authority to fund special projects and innovation and development activities relating to vocational education and the education of the handicapped either directly or through grants or contracts. A total appropriation of $69 million was to have been authorized for these activities for fiscal year 1977 and each of the three succeeding fiscal years.

Historical Background

To gain some perspective of the block grant "consolidation" issue, it is necessary to review the history of federal aid to education in the United States and some of the underlying ideologies involved in school financing in general and federal aid in particular.

Americans have always held education in special esteem with unique promise to solve national needs. The development of free public schools is one of the great success stories of the Nation. The founders of the country saw "the general diffusion of knowledge" as essential to the survival of the democracy. The immigrants saw the schools as the key to their great dream of equal opportunity for all. Education has been traditionally viewed as an investment--by business and manufacturers who sought greater productivity from a literate and trained worker, economists and politicians explaining increases in the gross national product, and individuals associating increased lifetime earnings as educational dividends.

Propelled by these forces, the public schools flourished. More recently however, the schools have become the vehicle for engineering social change. The new demands have sometimes exceeded their capacity to produce and consequently new doubts about efficiency have appeared. The old maxim, "you can lead a horse to water, but you can't make him drink," is seldom applied to schools today. Instead, it is assumed that if the watering trough is properly constructed and the horse is artfully led, he will drink. James Coleman reflects the attitude of the times when he states, "the responsibility to create achievement lies with the educational institution, not with the child."[10]

Schools are expected to change their procedures so that dropouts will not occur and, at the same time, provide a stimulating program for the instruction of the more eager and talented students. These changes, in turn, are expected to increase the productivity of our economy, promote domestic tranquility, provide a more informed electorate, and secure a better life for all.

With the changing role and increasing demands on the public schools, has come an increasing focus of national attention on the education process. Historically, the federal role in education has been one of benign neglect. The responsibility for public schooling rests with the states and it is still argued by some that to establish any national policy for education would run counter to the Constitutional doctrine that education should be "reserved to the states or the people."[11]

The fundamental responsibiltiy for operating public elementary and secondary schools rests with the local district. For this task the local school system has some special intrinsic strengths. The most important of these is community involvement. The rationale for community control of schools is a straightforward one: the residents of a community are the best judges of the appropriateness of teachers and curricula for that community. Community residents are citizens

not subjects. They should feel like owners rather than tenants within the schools.[12]

The local school system usually manages to avoid the cumbersome decision-making process which so often characterizes larger units of government. In most cases, it has insulated schools from partisan politics. Moreover, the dispersion of public schools serving 50,000,000 American children provides a safeguard against the misuse of education that might standardize political thought throughout the nation.[13]

Recognizing these strengths, however, should not blind one to the weaknesses that are inherent in the local school system as the operating unit for public schools throughout the United States. Local school districts vary greatly both in taxable resources and in competence of local leadership-conditions that tend to promote inequalities in educational opportunity. Local districts also suffer from over-dependence upon property taxation, placing excessive burdens upon local property owners while the benefits of public education are dispersed throughout the state and nation.

The increasing costs of competing services particularly in urban areas have made it increasingly difficult to win public support for school requirements. In 1960, for example, voters approved 89 percent of all school bond issues, in 1965 that figure dropped to 77 percent and in 1976 to only 46 percent.[14]

For some specialized educational services, the school district is too small, and a larger service area and tax base are needed. Finally, local school systems are not likely to provide unassisted, expensive, additional school services that the national interest might demand.

In most states the legislature is required by the state constitution to establish and maintain a system of free public schools. The fact that this duty has been exercised by creating local school administrative units does not remove the authority from the state legislature.

Educational responsibilities exercised directly by the state are not the same for all states. In general, each state legislature has created local educational agencies and defined the powers and duties of their governing boards. In most cases, this has included power to levy, within prescribed limits, a property tax for school purposes. However, funds for local school districts have been provided from other state tax sources as well. Minimum standards for the operation of public schools, including the certification of teachers, have been established. Teacher training institutions, teacher retirement systems, and state schools for the deaf and blind usually are operated by the state. In addition, state departments of education have been established to provide leadership for the improvement of education throughout the state.[15]

To fulfill these responsibilities, the state has some important strengths: it enjoys a high degree of independence from dominance by the national government, based upon a long history and firm legal base; it has broad taxing powers; and usually it is large enough to provide needed specialized services for local school districts, yet close enough to the operating school systems to be effective.

There are, however, several limitations to the development of American education if it were left solely to the states. For example, in view of their differences in taxable resources, inequalities of educational opportunity among states are inevitable. Also, expensive educational research, such as the development of instructional programs, evaluation procedures, and evaluation instruments that might be of great interest to all states, likely will be neglected if left entirely to individual states.

Another characteristic of our modern society is the mobility of the population making each state dependent upon the quality of schools in other states for the educational character of its people. Finally, some educational services (such as R.O.T.C.) which are clearly national concerns and produce values

accruing to all states, likely will be inadequately financed if left exclusively to individual states.

As noted earlier, the federal government historically has played a relatively minor role in public schooling in both policy intrusion and financial assistance. This situation has, however, changed dramatically within the last two decades. Over this period, federal money for elementary and secondary education, has increased nearly 14-fold, from just $500 million dollars in 1957-58 to $6.9 billion dollars in 1975-76.

However, as a proportion of total educational revenues, federal aid rose consistently to a high of 8 percent in 1967-68,[16] but has since declined slightly to 7 percent today. (The federal role in higher education is even more pronounced--$10 billion in 1975, nearly as much as the combined investment of all 50 states.)[17]

The Issue of Federal Control

The basic political issue most often raised in federal assistance to education is the question of control. Senator Claiborne Pell, one of the federal officials with great influence over education laws, is fond of remarking, "There is a great deal of truth in the old adage, 'He who pays the piper calls the tune.'"[18] Yale's Kingman Brewster echoes the traditional antipathy toward federal control with the view he feels Washington has adopted of "now that I have bought the button, I have a right to design the coat."[19] Of particular concern to educators is the increasing demand of Congress (and consequently the U.S. Office of Education and other executive agencies charged with implementing the laws) for accountability of federal funds in support of national education goals.

To insure Congressional intent is not circumvented, recent legislation introduced requires Congressional review of implementing directives,

instructions and regulations. Where once education lobbyists tended to support any halfway reasonable idea for new federal initiatives, they are now more wary of the erosion of local controls.[20] If educators were ever under the illusion that federal control would not follow the federal dole, they have certainly been disabused of that notion.

How has it come to pass that in spite of almost universal expressions of condemnation of federal control over federal funds for education, there is hardly a program (except for impacted area programs) that allocates federal money to elementary and secondary education that does not have strings attached?

The answer is partly to be found in the way in which these programs came into being. As pointed out by Munger and Fenno, the history of federal aid has been a series of responses to national crisis:

> More than any single cause, the rate of selective service rejections produced the demands for federal aid in 1918. Strengthened by other forces, the repetition of the same events in the World War II draft produced the 1943 Senate debate on federal aid. The depression forced emergency aid to education in the 1930s. The severe post-war teacher shortage stimulated the federal aid proposals of the late 1940s. The baby boom of the 1950s--abetted by suburban sprawl--generated the school construction bills of the same decade. Impacted areas legislation followed one national defense crisis, while the NDEA was called into existence by the cold war crisis that followed the launching of the Soviet Sputnik. Apparently no crisis has yet been big enough to justify general aid to education.[21]

It might be noted that this tradition was extended with the passage of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act in 1965, which was, in large measure, a response to a national crisis in poverty and race relations. So it appears inevitable that when federal monies for education are allocated to achieve national goals, there will be an accounting for the money spent and an evaluation of the results achieved.

There is a further explanation regarding the reason for existence of federal controls. Munger and Fenno point out that at least part of the confusion over the federal control issue arises from failure to attach precise meanings to the term, "federal control." They point to several examples of outright conflict between intentions to avoid federal control features in legislation by Congressmen. They cite the following amusing illustration of this:

> Thus in the 1948 debate on federal aid, Senator Hawkes of New Jersey proposed an amendment requiring the teaching of the Constitution of the United States "not less than two hours of classroom instruction during each four-week period within the school year above the fifth, excluding kindergarten." When Senator Taft described the amendment as violating every principle of the bill, Senator Hawkes acknowledged the general undesirability of prescribing curriculum but argued that the teaching of the Constitution was so important that an exception should be made in its case. Most of the votes cast for the amendment came from Senators who opposed federal aid because it would bring federal controls.[22]

Senator Robert Taft of Ohio argued that federal controls would have to accompany any effective equalization bill produced by Congress. Regardless of these views, there has been a deep commitment among educators and most legislators supporting federal aid to keep it clear of any control over state and local policy. Dr. Edgar Fuller of the Council of State School Officers, appearing before the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, said:

> There are almost as many people opposed to federal control of education as are opposed to Communism. I do not know of a single educator or school board official who favors federal control of education. All of us are against it. We will not tolerate it. Any federal assistance law we support must indisputably prevent federal control of educational programs in local districts.[23]

In spite of this feeling, NDEA and ESEA programs reflect federal control both in specifying the purposes for which federal funds will be spent and in the specific administrative guidelines that must be followed by local systems in

requesting funds, accounting for expenditures, and evaluating programs. But despite the fact that those opposed to federal aid on the grounds of federal control have seen their fears justified, local systems appear to be living with the result without too much outcry or prospect of revolt.

Two problems of federal control are illustrated in these two early major federal aid programs--the National Defense Education Act of 1958 and its amended version of 1964, and the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965--illustrate two types of federal control problems. The NDEA is typical of crisis legislation aimed at promoting a national goal. It was a national effort to overcome the technical superiority of the Soviet Union as evidenced in its early space successes. To close the perceived technological gap, it was intended to strengthen curricula in mathematics and science, as well as foreign languages. In 1964, the Act was broadened to include history, civics, geography, English, and reading. It appears that there were two reasons the act was broadened in this fashion. First, the urgency of the national priority for strengthening math and science that existed in 1958 had lessened in 1964, and second, the commercial by-products of the Act rallied the support of commercial intersts. The way in which the Act was broadened suggests that the latter influence was rather strong, for the grants authorized under the Act were primarily for the acquisition of equipment.

Don White, who was the chief lobbyist for the National Audiovisual Association (NAVA) during this period asserted that total sales of the audiovisual industry doubled within a year after passage of the NDEA Act, doubled again after its amendment in 1964, and doubled once more after the ESEA amendments of 1968. He claims responsibility for inserting the word audiovisual twenty-eight times in the NDEA Amendment of 1964.[24]

In effect, the NDEA served to support general education but channelled this support to commercial interests. An expensive system of accountability is

required to insure that the funds are spent in the manner specified under the law.

NDEA, therefore, represents two important weaknesses in categorical aid: 1) the inevitable residual from outmoded priority programs, and 2) the red tape required to insure that categorical aid is used for the purposes specified.

ESEA Title I represents another type of federal control problem. There is little question that this law was needed to initiate a massive assault on the problem of educating the poor. However, in developing the guidelines for this program and in their subsequent administration, the federal government assumed an impossible responsibility for evaluating the myriad proposals under Title I (and Title III) and in reviewing the evaluations of programs approved. The diversity of conditions surrounding the design and implementation of these proposals taxes the imagination.

Educators who control funds have a powerful drive to insert themselves into plans for use of those funds. This tendency may not be limited to educators. But, it is extremely strong in them since they are by nature hell-bent on solving the problems of the world through education, and each has his own special remedy.[25] There is no reason to believe that a collection of educators in the U.S. Office of Education would be any different in this respect than a collection at the state or local level.

The Role of Federal Financial Aid

Since the principle of federal aid to education is by now well established, the major issues (aside for the amount of funds to be provided) center around the role of federal government finance. As a partner for public education, the federal government has some special contributions to offer.

First, the federal government brings to the educational partnership a national point of view as well as the ability to focus the attention of the nation upon the problems of education. Second, the federal government provides a more efficient way to finance research and development work of common value to all states. Third, it is able to produce a revenue potential unhampered by overdependence upon property taxation or by interstate economic competition. Fourth (and perhaps of greatest importance), only the federal government can compensate for deficiencies within the school tax potential of low-income states and provide resources needed to raise school standards in these states.

There are, of course, inherent limitations to the effectiveness of federal action in the field of education just as there are to state and local agencies. It is self-evident that of the three levels, the federal government is farthest removed from the classroom where the actual teaching and learning processes occur. To the local board of education, education is its only problem; to state government, education may be its major problem; but to the federal government, education is only one of many problems. This may explain the reason federal action in the field of education, in many instances, has appeared incidental to other federal concerns (e.g., national defense, full employment, the elimination of poverty, and racial equality).

There are other weaknesses in the federal government's share of the partnership. For instance, federal categorical aids for special programs fail to recognize differences in educational needs in different communities.

There is a consensus among educators and politicians at all levels as to the general objective of federal aid: to provide equality of education for all children. President Nixon in his 1974 message to Congress stated: ...."One goal which unites all of our people is to provide each of our children with a sound basic education. No matter what race, faith, or family circumstances,

each child should have equal access to a good education."[26] Chairman Perkins of the House Committee on Education and Labor commenting on administration proposals for education said: "Sweeping modifications in student aid legislation should be made only if such action will further the frequently stated Congressional intent that no student shall be denied an opportunity for higher education because of financial need."[27]

The question then is what role the federal government is to play? Should it be basically noncoercive and limited to advice in its financial contributions? The financial aid of categorical programs in recent years has been restricted by guidelines and regulations that have tended to add a coercive quality to the federal role.

Furthermore, the proliferation of federal education legislation (306 bills relating to education were referred to the House Committee on Education and Labor in 1975)[28] have produced an almost incomprehensible bureaucratic maze. The House Committee on Education and Labor had 114 federal education programs with expiration dates during the 94th Congress.[29] A recent study by the Library of Congress identified 439 separate statutory authorities affecting post-secondary education alone.[30] These programs are administered by more than 42 federal agencies besides the U.S. Office of Education.[31] Table II shows the distribution of these programs among 18 of the 22 standing committees of the House and 16 of the 18 Senate committees.

There have been a number of attempts to "consolidate" education programs under one Congressional committee in each House. They have failed primarily because education has become politically popular. Harry Summerfield illustrates this point in his narration of the birth of the Environmental Education Act conceived by Rep. James H. Scheuer in 1969:

TABLE II

NUMBER OF FEDERAL PROGRAMS AFFECTING EDUCATION BY COMMITTEE JURISDICTION IN THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE AND SENATE (SOURCE: American Law of the Library of Congress)

HOUSE / SENATE	Aeronautical and Space Sciences	Agricultural and Forestry	Appropriations	Armed Services	Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs	Commerce	Finance	Foreign Relations	Government Operations	Interior and Insular Affairs	Judiciary	Labor and Public Welfare	Post Office and Civil Service	Public Works	Veteran's Affairs	District of Columbia	TOTAL HOUSE
Agriculture		14															14
Appropriations			3														3
Armed Services				13													13
Banking and currency					8												8
District of Columbia																1	1
Education and Labor										3		114					117
International Relations								7									7
Government Operations									1								1
House Administration												4		1			5
Interior and Insular Affairs										12							12
Interstate and Foreign Commerce	1					7	10		2			125		12			157
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy																	
Judiciary							2	1			11						14
Merchant Marine and Fisheries						3						1					4
Post Office and Civil Service									2				1				3
Public Works	1											1		9			11
Science and Technology	4					1						32					37
Veteran's Affairs															11		11
Ways and Means							8										8
TOTAL SENATE	6	14	3	13	8	11	20	8	5	15	11	277	1	22	11	1	426*

*In addition, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy has thirteen (13) programs under its jurisdiction.

> The legislative assistant made no further inquiries either within Congress or in the Republican administration. In dealing with flashy legislation like environmental education, covetousness and a degree of secrecy are necessary lest the idea be hijacked by a senator, a bureaucrat, or another representative before Mr. Scheuer could gain sponsorship and credit. Some members of Capitol Hill can become quite competitive.[32]

Congressman Scheuer's fears were well founded since the Bill was indeed introduced by Rep. John Brademas, Chairman of the Education Select Subcommittee, as the principal sponsor. This was unfortunate for Rep. Scheuer's publicity needs, but helpful for the Bill in having a subcommittee chairman shepherd its passage into law.

Any attempt to reassign attention-getting, grant-producing federal programs from one committee to another for purposes of consolidation requires a more centralized decision-making process than Congress by nature can achieve.

Because of this diffusion of legislative authority, education lobby groups have sometimes been able to appeal to more than one committee to achieve the same general objective.

The number of committees involved and laws passed relates directly, of course, to the proliferation of federal red tape. Each statute grants authority for carrying out a program to some official in the executive branch. Here again there is room for choice. Lobby groups and key members of Congress might push for giving the authority to agency X if it seems more able or willing to implement a particular new initiative than agency Y. Whenever an authority ends up, that agency must usually draft and publish regulations to carry out the program or law. These regulations typically include definitions, timetables, quantitative criteria to translate general statutory language into measurable factors, and so forth.

Dr. Neal Shedd, chief of the regulations division of the U.S. Office of Education provides the following estimated man-days required to write an education regulation:[33]

A large and difficult piece of legislation such as Title I ESEA:

Professional man days	898
Nonprofessional man days	71
Total	969 Man Days

Small, uncomplicated piece of legislation:

Professional man days	204
Nonprofessional man days	48
Total	252 Man Days

This does not include the time lag in "processing" a regulation for approval. The USOE lists some 126 programs under its administration.[34]

The myriad of forms, regulations, reports, and sundry information requirements accompanying federal aid has received a quantum increase by the demand for "accountability." Not surprisingly, this has generated a growing outcry from educators and administrators. While the basic argument is a revival of the federal control issue which had become somewhat dormant in the 1960s, much of the rhetoric is focused on the concept of accountability. The proliferation of categorical aid programs has built a substantial and broad constituency despite the limited focus of each program and the reticence to raise the specter of federal control may be a natural reluctance to bite the hand that feeds. It is much safer to attack the validity of accountability than to risk competing for limited general aid funds.

The Opposition to Program Consolidation

The foregoing discussion has treated the general issue of federal aid. The Ford Administration's proposal for a block grant, however, was concerned with only a small number of categorical aid programs (although it included the largest funded programs for elementary and secondary education).

In the period after its adoption in 1965, the ESEA was amended on five separate occasions. Each time, new titles or additional authorities under existing titles were added in order to provide funds for highly specialized purposes or target groups. In 1966, funds were earmarked for four specific disadvantaged groups under Title I, including the handicapped, delinquent children, Indians, and migrant children. The following year, four additional authorities were added: the drop-out prevention program (Title VIII), the bilingual education program (Title VII), a 15 percent earmark of Title III funds for the handicapped, and a new program of special incentive grants under Title I designed to stimulate an increase in the level of educational expenditures.

The 1970 ESEA Amendments continued the trend, establishing five further grant authorities. Funds were earmarked under Title I for school districts with high concentrations of low income students; two additional funding authorities were added to the state education agency support program of Title V; and two new demonstration grant programs, one for health and nutrition services and the other for drop-out prevention, were included in Title VIII. Finally, in 1972, a new Title providing funding for ethnic heritage studies (Title IX), was established and two new authorities for consumer education and Indian education programs were added to existing titles.

Moreover, during this same period, numerous other grant programs for elementary and secondary education were enacted in the areas of adult and community education, vocational education, and education for the handicapped; further efforts were undertaken through the various projects and programs authorized by the Economic Opportunity Act. As a result of this snowballing proliferation, by the early 1970s there were 38 separate grant authorizations for "instruction," 37 authorizations for low-income students, and 22 separate authorizations for reading programs.[35] Since each of these authorities has its own unique eligibility criteria, funding application procedures, program guidelines and requirements, and funding periods, the burden of red-tape, paperwork and compliance activities imposed on state and local education agencies have become both massive and counterproductive.

Against this backdrop of grant proliferation, bureaucratic strangulation and the threat of being buried under an avalanche of paper, it would appear there would have been no difficulty in mustering support for the Ford Administration's proposal for consolidation.

This is not the case, however. In interviews with staff members of Congressional education committees, the U.S. Office of Education and the major education lobby groups, opposition to the proposal was virtually unanimous.*

The most frequently voiced objection was the fear that consolidation of programs would result in a reduction of support. The Ford proposal was only the latest in a series of consolidation efforts of the Republican Administrations begun in 1971. In April of that year, President Nixon sent a special message to Congress calling for a sweeping simplification of federal aid to education.

*There were three exceptions among the lobby groups in which cautious support was given. These were: The National Governor's Conference, the National Conference of State Legislatures, and the Council of Chief State School Officers. This is not surprising since the block grant provides for the states a much greater role and flexibility in administering the funds of the consolidated programs.

In that message he stated:

> "The plan I am putting forward today for Education Revenue Sharing brings together more than 30 federal aid categories and deals with one of the nation's most complex systems for providing public services. Under the present piecemeal system of federal aid....the time, energy, and imagination needed to bring education reform is frequently drained off in what is essentially a non-productive effort to qualify for Government grants....My proposal for special revenue sharing for education is designed to overcome these problems by substituting a basic new approach to providing federal assistance."[36]

The 1971 proposal provided for the distribution of $3.0 billion annually through five broad programs. These included: 1) compensatory education for the disadvantaged; 2) aid for the handicapped; 3) vocational education; 4) assistance for federally affected areas; and 5) supportive educational services. States were to be automatically entitled to formula grants in each of the five areas, and up to 30 percent of the funds could be shifted from one category to another, with the exception that no reduction could be made in the allotment for the disadvantaged. The intent was to reduce federal supervision and detailed program regulation to a minimum.

Congress took no meaningful action on the education revenue sharing proposal during either 1971 or 1972. The most important source of the deadlock was an intense dispute between the Administration and Congress over levels of education funding and appropriations during FY 73 and the first part of FY 74. Because Congress failed to pass an HEW-Labor appropriations bill during FY 73 that the Administration considered fiscally responsible, the Office of Education was forced to operate under a continuing resolution for the entire year. However, the continuing resolution itself was subject to heated controversy because OMB and HEW interpreted it to mean operations should be carried out at the actual FY 72 spending levels, whereas Congress insisted that the

continuing resolution mandated spending at the lower of either the House or Senate passed FY 73 appropriations bill (the Conference reported bill on this was vetoed).

This difference in interpretation led to what was, in effect, a $530 million impoundment of FY 73 Office of Education funds, including $286 million in ESEA funds. This ESEA impoundment amounted to nearly 14 percent of Title I funds, 19 percent of the funds for the other Titles, and nearly 40 percent of funds for Title V.

The dispute over funding levels was intensified with the release of the FY 74 budget in January, 1973. In a list of more than 100 programs to be reduced or terminated during FY 74, there were included a number of elementary and secondary education funding authorities. Termination of these authorities was expected to result in a budget savings of nearly $260 million during FY 74.

In addition, it was again urged that all of the remaining categorical education programs be folded into a somewhat revised form of education revenue sharing. However, due to the actual termination of some programs which had been included in the 1971 proposal, the overall funding level for education revenue sharing would have been lower than previously proposed, and lower than the previous combined actual appropriation for both the programs to be terminated and those which were to be consolidated under Education Revenue Sharing.

The combination of the FY 73 impoundments and the FY 74 budget proposals led many strong advocates of federal aid-to-education to charge that education revenue sharing was a transparent maneuver to reduce the overall federal commitment in this area. Chairman Perkins of the Education and Labor Committee, for example, denounced the Administration proposals as an "abandonment of federal education programs" and insisted that, "education

revenue sharing is foolish. It would be throwing money down ratholes."[37]

On the other hand, attitudes like those of Chairman Perkins and Congress's general unwillingness to seriously consider the need for reform and simplification of the federal aid-to-education effort, encouraged the Administration to take an equally unyielding stand. At a press conference in January, 1973, Commissioner of Education, Sidney Marland, said that it was "irrevelant" to talk of alternatives to education revenue sharing: "ERS is the aim of the Administration and the posture of HEW....We stand on ERS, live or die."[38]

It was in the context of these recalcitrant postures on both sides that the Better Schoos Act, a revision of the 1971 proposal, was introduced in the House during March, 1973. The Administration believed that the FY 73 impoundments and the threat of $260 million in FY 74 education program reductions would force Congress to finally act on its consolidation proposals.

The Better Schools Act adopted the same five categories as those contained in the previous education revenue sharing proposal. However, the level of funding for federally affected areas and for supportive services would have been substantially below the level provided in the disputed FY 73 appropriation resolution.

Although most of the objections to the previous proposals were accommodated in the 1976 Ford consolidation proposal, the controversy had left a bitter legacy with Congress and educational groups that precluded favorable action on almost any block grant proposed by a Republican Administration.

Compounding the antagonism was the manner in which the Administration drafted its proposal. The program was put together by OMB with only a review permitted by the Assistant Secretary of HEW for Education. No coordination was made with the USOE or the minority members of Congress on the draft.

As a consequence, Rep. Quie, the ranking Republican on the House Committee for Education and Labor was persuaded to sponsor the Bill only after a lengthy breakfast session with President Ford and the incorporation of a number of revisions.[39] The USOE, denied input, drafted an alternative proposal that contained a state option feature that permitted acceptance of block grant funding or continuation of categorical aid.[40] It also contained a "comprehensive program review" provision that was a bureaucratic job security feature.

A number of the education lobbyists also expressed dissatisfaction with the size of annual increase in funding ($200 million) stating this was well below the increases generally provided under categorical funding.

In addition to distrust of a Republican Administration to use block grant funding as a device to lower federal aid to education, there is considerable distrust among local educators of the states to properly administer the funds. Typical of local administrators' views are those of Dr. Mark Shedd, an urban school superintendent supporting categorical aid programs before Congress. Dr. Shedd expressed the fear that grants to the states would go for "more of the same" in education. "The federal government has an important role to play, through categorical grants in promoting change."[41] Another superintendent preferred categorical grants because urban problems are not appreciated statewide. He feared other state priorities, such as teachers' salaries would "gobble up" the money.[42] Dr. Ralph Hood, a school superintendent in Georgia was even more emphatic. He stated flatly that block grants to his state would completely destroy the special programs underway. "States gave us nothing, we had to come to Washington to get....fair treatment."[43]

Rep. Brademas, Chairman of the Select Committee, summed up his opposition to block grants: 1) the possibility of greater difficulty in carrying out mandates against racial discrimination; 2) the possibility of church-state

programs; 3) the discriminating pattern of state aid to local educational agencies; and 4) the "naked shameless politics" of elected chief state school officers.[44]

Since the Congress has failed to act favorably on virtually all consolidation proposals, it is apparent this prerogative to retain "political action" is jealously guarded indeed.

Even the AFL-CIO representing union teachers has fought switching control to the states.[45] It is readily apparent from reviewing the testimony of witnesses in committee hearings that categorical aid programs quickly develop a dedicated constituency among educators who are recipients of funds and administrators tasked with implementing the program. Their success in perpetuating and expanding programs point out one of the inherent problems with categorical funding, i.e., it is politically expedient to initiate new programs and virtually impossible to eliminate those established.

The federal impact aid program, begun in World War II to ease the burden of military dependents on local school operations, serves as a good example of the political durability of categorical aid programs. Every President from Eisenhower on has tried to reduce or eliminate impact aid or at least to slow its growth, but none have succeeded because the 4600 school districts affected are located in more than half the Congressional districts.[46] From 1971 to 1976, the administration made requests for repeal or lapse of 98 specific education authorities. As of March 31, 1976, Congress had acceded on only three occasions although four unrequested programs had been consolidated by Congressional initiative.[47]

Summary

Since 1965, the question of federal funding for education has not been whether there shall be federal aid, but how it shall be administered.

The federal role has evolved from "benign neglect" to an active partnership with states and local school districts. Early in the history of the Republic, national leaders were enthusiastic advocates of the cause of education, but wary of a federal role in financing as an intrusion in state control. More recently, in addition to advocating better education, the federal government has sought to compensate, in various ways, for deficiencies in the school tax base. To summarize, federal activities in the field of education have expanded to accomplish several different purposes:

1. To promote the cause of education.
2. To broaden the scope of school programs and services, especially those programs and services that contribute directly to national goals (such as full employment).
3. To educate individuals for whom the federal government accepts responsibility.
4. To improve the methods and technology of education.
5. To compensate for deficiencies in the school tax base.

With few exceptions,* the federal government has sought to accomplish these purposes without directly operating schools or colleges. The tendency for the federal government to avoid direct operation of elementary and secondary schools properly reflects a conviction that states and localities are in a better position to obtain essential parental participation in school affairs; to assess the particular educational needs of the community and; to administer programs more effectively and efficiently.

The categorical-aid system has induced public schools to make concerted attacks upon selected national problems, but it has failed to provide assurances that each state will maintain a free public school system meeting acceptable

*Two notable exceptions to this general policy are the federally operated schools for Indian children and the overseas schools for dependents of American personnel stationed overseas.

standards. Moreover, the number of different federal aids has become excessive. We have now reached a point where consolidation of these various categorical aids into a few broad categories obviously is needed. Moreover, it is important that these categories be related to ongoing federal concerns. For example, the federal government's participation in the field of vocational education beginning with the Smith-Hughes Act of 1917 has moved ahead consistently over the years. In order to discharge its obligations towards stimulating the economy and creating full employment, the federal government must have available the power to stimulate vocational education throughout the country. Thus, the categorical aids for vocational education are related to a primary, non-educational concern of the federal government.

More recently, the federal program of aid for disadvantaged children has increased rapidly. This program reflects a general federal concern to aid minorities seeking an appropriate place in American life. One way to move closer to this goal is to improve educational opportunities for disadvantaged children in the public schools. This again illustrates a federal categorical aid that is related to a federal concern. Experience indicates that the federal government will finance categorical aids if related to a general federal concern.

The evolution of the federal role in education has reached a stage in which general purpose aid or revenue sharing for public schools should spell out mutual assurances between the states and the federal government describing more clearly the role of each.

It is time to assess the impact of the proliferation of categorical aid programs. The selection of federal assistance categories, the federal guidelines and regulations that must be followed to obtain funds has the unavoidable effect of establishing certain priorities and values at the expense of others. The demand for accountability has led to excessive federal control that often

distorts educational goals set by state and local officials and the bureaucratic maze of administrative agencies make a coherent and coordinated national policy for education impossible. The forms, reports, and regulations inherent to categorical aid are excessively wasteful of time and money spent on overhead. The federal aid system has become a patchwork of complicated formulas that often have little relationship to local school budgets or to the kinds of educational services that a local school system provides.

To define the federal-state-local education roles, the state education agency should receive and administer all federal funds for public schools in accordance with plans developed by the state and approved by the U.S. Office of Education.

This policy is essential in order for states to discharge their obligations to public schools. The federal government contributes less than 10 percent to the cost of operating public elementary and secondary schools. These funds are earmarked for a variety of purposes and they must be coordinated with much larger amounts of funds from state and local sources, often for similar purposes. The coordinating responsibility should rest with state governments under a state plan that has been approved by the federal government. Strict adherence to this policy should reduce the need for a large number of federal program reviewers and encourage states to accept the basic responsibility for elementary and secondary schools.

Representatives of large city school systems often find it inconvenient to go through the state government in dealing with the federal government. They claim that it simply delays operations and makes the system less efficient. This criticism however can be avoided if the state program is well planned and some direct contact between the city school officials and federal agencies is permitted.

Particularly with the Congress, this will allow a national forum for the focus of attention on areas or programs of special needs.

The Ford Administration proposal for consolidation of the largest categorical aid programs into a block grant of federal aid to the states was a large step in the development of a proper educational partnership between federal and state agencies and local school systems. That the political heritage and climate of 1976 caused it to fail is unfortunate. But the principles and objectives of block grant funding, coupled with a commitment to increase the federal share in education financing, should be a goal of the Carter Administration.

Educators and administrators should support the block grant funding concept with a concerted and unified effort that would focus on the level of federal support to be provided rather than a competition between categorical aid programs. The goal should be for eventual movement to general purpose funding for the majority of federal aid that will place the federal responsibility for public education on a full partnership level with a 30-35 percent share of financing.

The essential step necessary is the commitment of local educators and administrators to the strengthening of state education agencies, programs, and policies that can demonstrate to the people of the state and the federal government that:

1. no child will be denied admission to any school because of his race or religion;

2. school policies will foster racially integrated school programs and, wherever possible, racially balanced schools;

3. all accredited elementary and secondary schools will maintain a satisfactory basic program of instruction prescribed by the state;

4. suitable remedial or compensatory education will be available for all children in need of such instruction;

5. all high school graduates will be prepared to enter a four-year college and/or have a cluster of practical skills useful in the search for employment;

6. suitable education will be provided for all children with physical and emotional disorders; and

7. adequate financial resources will be available to public schools in all parts of the state without excessive local taxation.

These are the kinds of assurances that the states should provide to the federal government as a condition for receiving general purpose grants or shared revenues for public school. The adoption of such a state grant should make it unnecessary for the federal government to exercise detailed control over school operations, yet at the same time, assure that certain fundamental requirements in the field of education will be met in each of the 50 states.

REFERENCE NOTES

[1]"Financial Assistance for Elementary and Secondary Education Act." White House Fact Sheet: March 1976.

[2]"The Financial Assistance for Elementary and Secondary Education Act - A Better Plan." Congressional Record, March 1, 1976: H1402.

[3]"S.3166." Senate of the United States, 94th Congress, March 17, 1976.

[4]Based on interviews with Jack Jennings and Charles Radcliffe, Majority and Minority Counsels, respectively, for the House Committee on Education and Labor; Jeanne Froelicher, Minority Counsel for Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare; Bob Rothbard, OMB staff; Tom John, USOE staff; and a number of Washington education lobbyists.

[5]Activity Report of the Committee on Education and Labor. U.S. House of Representatives Report No. 94-1785, Washington, D.C., 1977: 26.

[6]Hartman, Robert W. and Alice M. Rivlin. "Rethinking the Role of the Federal Government in Elementary and Secondary Education in the Seventies." Needs of Elementary and Secondary Education for the Seventies. A compendium of policy papers compiled by the General Subcommittee on Education, U.S. House of Representatives, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1970: 363-366.

[7]"The Financial Assistance for Elementary and Secondary Education Act - A Better Plan." Op. Cit: H1402-1403.

[8]The Budget of the U.S. Government FY 1977 Appendix. U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1976: 388.

[9]"H.R. 12196," House of Representatives, 94th Congress, March 1, 1976. Section 106.

[10]Coleman, James S. "Equal Educational Opportunity." Harvard Educational Review. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1970: 24.

[11]Brewster, Kingman, Jr. "Academic Freedom and Federal Largesse." Journal of Teacher Education, Vol. 26, No. 2, Summer 1975: 156.

[12]Colton, David L. "Toward Reform of Urban School Government." Needs of Elementary and Secondary Education for the Future. Op. Cit: 122.

[13]Lindman, Erick L. Dilemmas of School Finance. Educational Research Service, Inc. Arlington, Virginia, 1975: 1.

[14]Bentsen, Lloyd. "If I am Elected." Change, February 1976: 10.

[15]Lindman, Erick L. Op. Cit: 2.

[16]Berke, Joel S. and others. "Federal Aid to Education: Who Benefits?" Issues in School Finance, Select Committee on Equal Educational Opportunity, U.S. Senate, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1972: 32, 55.

[17]Honey, John C. and Terry W. Hartle. "Should the Federal Government Take Over the States' Responsibility for Higher Education?" Change, June 1975: 46.

[18]Quote taken from Chester E. Finn. "Federalism and the Universities: The Balance Shifts." Change, Winter 1975-76: 24.

[19]Ibid.

[20]Andringa, Robert C. "The View From the Hill." Change, April, 1976: 26.

[21]Munger, Frank, Jr., and Richard F. Fenno, National Politics and Federal Aid to Education. Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1962: pp. 16-17.

[22]Ibid: 20.

[23]Ibid.

[24]From a personal interview with Mr. White who is now the Deputy State Superintendent of Schools for California as the California State School Administration's resident lobbyist in Washington.

[25]Blanchard, Robert W. and Victor W. Doherty. Op. Cit: 38.

[26]Nixon, Richard M. "Proposals for Improvement of the Educational System." Presidential Message for House Committee on Education and Labor, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., January 1974: 1.

[27]Perkins, Carl D. "Congressional Prospects." Change, March 1975: 8.

[28]U.S. House of Representatives Legislative Calendar, First Session, 94th Congress. Superintendent of Documents, Capitol Building, Washington, D.C., January 1976: 261.

[29]Andringa, Robert C. Op. Cit: 27.

[30]Ibid: 28.

[31]Campbell, Roald F. and Arthur E. Wise. "Federalism, Finance, and Education in the Seventies." Change, April 1976: 88.

[32]Summerfield, Harry L. Power and Process. McCutchan Publishing Corp., Berkeley, California, 1974: 49.

[33]U.S. Office of Education Inter-office Memorandum, May 8, 1974.

[34]"Guide to OE-Administered Programs," American Education, July 1975.

[35]"Background Report on ESEA." Legislative Digest, Vol. III, No. 8, March 1974: 35.

[36]Ibid: 36.

[37]Ibid: 37.

[38]Ibid: 37.

[39]Interview with Charles Radcliffe, Minority Counsel, House Committee on Education and Labor.

[40]"Three-Part Proposal for Program Consolidation and De-regulation," internal discussion paper, USOE.

[41]"Hearings Before the Committee on Education and Labor 91st Congress," U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1970: 343.

[42]Ibid: 342.

[43]Ibid: 343.

[44]Ibid: 362.

[45]Interview with Walter Davis Educational Director of AFL-CIO.

[46]"Summary of Major Federation Education Legislation." The National Association of State Boards of Education, NASBE Publication 75-2, Denver, Colorado, 1975: 64.

[47]Caton, Joan. Memo prepared by Legislative Research Division, U.S. Office of Education.